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Background and Acknowledgments 
 
As we enter the new millennium, the citizens of The Pacific Northwest face a number of 
important environmental challenges. For example, they know that a majority of streams fail to 
meet water quality standards and that many salmon stocks are listed as threatened or endangered 
regionwide. In addition, the recently published Oregon State of the Environment Report 
identified a number of areas where Oregonians can expect continued problems under current 
policies and programs including: poor water quality (especially in urban and agricultural areas), 
inadequate water supplies, loss of wetlands, degraded riparian areas, depleted fish stocks, 
invasion of exotic species, diminished biodiversity, increasing waste and toxic releases, and 
effects of global climate change. Similar problems are sure to exist in Washington State. 
 
These types of environmental issues threaten to constrain the economy and quality-of-life of 
communities throughout the region. They also tend to disproportionately affect jobs, public 
health and quality-of-life in low-income communities and neighborhoods. The public and 
decision makers want to take appropriate steps to resolve these problems, but often hesitate 
because they fear the economic consequences will be too severe.  
 
In the spring of 1999, The Center for Watershed and Community Health (CWCH), a research 
institute in the Mark O. Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University, initiated a 
project to help the public and decision makers throughout the region better understand the 
economic and jobs issues associated with developing a more environmentally sustainable 
economy. The PSU CWCH seeks to provide accurate, objective, and easy-to-understand 
information about the potential costs and benefits associated with adopting practices and policies 
that can resolve pressing problems such as endangered salmon and lead to a more 
environmentally efficient economy. The PSU CWCH has developed collaborative research 
partnerships with a number of academic institutions in Washington and Oregon, provides grants 
to a number of leading economists and completes its own research to accomplish this goal.  This 
assessment is one in a series of reports being produced as part of this effort. The project is an 
integral part of PSU CWCH’s focus on developing new, more effective and efficient approaches 
to environmental governance. 
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Introduction  
 
This report examines the principles, practices and policies of Extended Producer Responsibility 
(EPR) and "product take-back" programs, and their potential application to the Pacific 
Northwest. EPR is an emerging principle for sustainable development that encourages producers 
to design their consumer products and delivery systems to keep waste and hazardous materials 
out of the waste stream. At its core, EPR focuses on the responsibility that producers have for the 
waste and environmental impacts their products generate at the end of their life-cycle. 
 
We have examined EPR to determine the degree to which product take-back policies and 
practices can contribute to the development of an environmentally sustainable regional economy. 
The search for new approaches to sustainability is driven, in part, by the fact that the region is 
struggling to conserve energy and water while restoring endangered salmon and other ecological 
systems at the same time that pollution and waste are growing at, or above, the rate of economic 
and population growth. For example, in 1992, when the population was 2,979,000 and the Gross 
State Product was $63.3 billion, Oregon generated 4,986,401 tons of pollution and waste, which 
equates to 1.67 tons per capita. By 1996, when the state's population had grown to 3,181,000 and 
Gross State Product was $94.4 billion, Oregon generated 9,055,794 tons of pollution and waste, 
or 2.85 tons per capita.1 Similar patterns are found in Washington State where in 1992 each 
person generated an average of 2,520 tons of waste, growing to 2,853 tons per capita in 1996.2  
Energy, water and salmon conservation will fail unless the region somehow can reduce its waste 
and associated environmental impacts. 
 
Traditionally, taxpayers have paid the costs of waste disposal while local government waste 
management authorities have been responsible for managing the process. The companies that 
design, produce and sell the products that fill the waste stream for the most part have not been 
responsible for the costs or management of the disposal stage of their products. As the 
complexities and costs of waste management have increased, however, existing approaches to 
waste management and disposal are increasingly being questioned.  EPR and product take-back 
are some of the more promising approaches being pursued to resolve the issues. 
 
The case studies and data assessed in this report suggest that if the proper governance system and 
strategies are established, EPR and product take-back strategies can save firms millions of dollars 
annually, increase revenues, and enhance their overall productivity while also reducing costs for 
taxpayers and reducing waste and environmental impacts. Our hope is that this information offers 
some assistance to the public and private sectors in the Northwest as they search for new ways to 
cope with the growing amount of waste and hazardous materials generated in the region.  
 
Overview of the Report 
 
We begin this assessment by discussing the principles and practices associated with EPR and 
product take-back. We then examine a number of policy approaches and instruments that have 
been used to promote EPR. This is followed by case studies of selected take-back programs 
established voluntarily by major U.S. corporations. We conclude with an analysis of the key 
issues that must be addressed to develop effective EPR policies and programs in the Pacific  
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Northwest. The appendix includes the information generated from our case studies of both 
voluntary and mandated take-back programs in nine countries, covering five major industries. 
 
A semi-structured questionnaire was used to collect much of the information discussed in this 
report. When personal contacts were not available, information was generated from case studies 
and government and corporate websites. Because EPR programs and policies are relatively new, 
assessments of their economic costs and benefits were difficult to obtain. 
 
Why The Growing Interest in Extended Producer Responsibility? 
 
The first EPR policy and product take-back program was the Ordinance on Avoidance of 
Packaging Waste in Germany, in 1991. It required the take-back of packaging waste either by the 
entity that put the waste on the market or by a nationwide collection scheme in which that entity 
participated. Since that time, EPR policies and programs have been enacted or are under serious 
consideration in many industrialized nations including Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway, Switzerland, France, Sweden, Austria, Japan, Taiwan, The United Kingdom, Korea, 
Canada as well as numerous provincial and state governments.  
 
Three major trends explain the growing interest in EPR. First, an increasing number of nations, 
states and communities are facing a shortage of landfill space. Many western European nations 
have exhausted almost all available landfill sites. Some eastern U.S. states are running out of 
suitable landfill capacity, and Lane County, Oregon, and other Northwest communities will soon 
face similar constrains. This trend has, out of necessity, forced waste management authorities to 
find alternative methods to dispose of waste such as incineration and source reduction. It has also 
led to higher tipping fees charged at landfills to dump waste.  
 
Second, the waste stream has become increasing more toxic. As technology grows in importance, 
pencils and paper have given way to computers and fax machines and other products. These 
products often contain lead, cadmium and other toxic compounds that generate significant risks 
to the environment and human health. At the end of their life-cycles, much of this ends up in the 
waste stream. Incineration can release toxic substances into the atmosphere while landfilling can 
leach toxic compounds into groundwater and eventually into the food chain.  
 
Finally, the increasing lack of landfill space and complexity of managing the toxicity in the waste 
stream has made waste management much more expensive. At a time when the budgets of local 
governments are stretched thin, officials are asking why they should bear the burden for a 
problem that is not of their own making and about which they can do very little on their own to 
prevent. In addition, as costs rise, the public is increasingly interested in finding ways to shift the 
costs of waste management back to the producers that generate the waste. It is for these reasons 
that interest is growing in many parts of the industrialized world in EPR and product take-back. 
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Principles and Practices and Extended Producer Responsibility 
 
The concept of EPR and product take-back is not new. It has actually been around for hundreds 
of years. Before the twentieth century, most Americans produced very little waste. With 
consumer goods, resources and money in limited supply, everything possible was reused. For 
example, turn-of-the-century milk and cola distributors who sold their products in glass jars and 
then collected the jars from the consumer for refilling were practicing what we now call product 
take-back. Driven by need, take-back programs were the rule, not the exception.  
 
In the last hundred years, however, the historic focus on continual reuse and recycling has been 
replaced by the mass production of disposable goods, mass consumption, and massive amounts 
of waste generated on a previously unimaginable scale. The relatively new phenomenon of 
massive amounts of waste has led to one of the fundamental principles of EPR: producers have a 
responsibility for the waste and environmental impacts generated by their products. Economists 
often call this "cost internalization." This principle means that the producers are responsible for 
unacceptable environmental impacts stemming from market failures that produce "externalized 
costs." While public-private cost sharing strategies are often used in EPR programs, this principle 
fundamentally shifts the burden of responsibility from government and taxpayers to those that 
generate the waste in the first place. Perhaps the ideal example of this principle is product 
leasing. When a company adopts a program to lease, rather than sell its products, the producer 
never terminates ownership. This allows the producer to maintain control of the product over its 
entire lifecycle, ensuring the collection of the product before it enters the waste stream, the 
repairing and reusing of components, and the prevention of environmentally harmful impacts.  
 
Another key principle of EPR is that the most effective way to reduce waste and environmental 
impacts is to design out the problems before they occur, rather than attempting to manage waste 
and control environmental impacts after they are generated.  Thus, EPR places the intervention 
focus on changes within product design, development, delivery and collection systems, rather 
than on manufacturing facilities and waste disposal methods. This encourages firms to design 
their products for easy disassembly; to use fewer, lighter, more durable and less toxic materials; 
and to restructure product delivery and collection systems to more easily recapture end-of-life 
goods for reuse, remanufacturing and recycling.  
 
These principles underscore that EPR is not aimed at simply encouraging more recycling. 
Recycling alone can actually perpetuate the production of energy and material intensive products 
and hazardous materials as industry responds to expanding markets. Instead, the ultimate goal of 
EPR is to encourage producers to reduce and detoxify material and energy intensity in every 
stage of a product's life-cycle. This emphasis requires that fundamental changes be made 
"upstream" in the design phase of products and processes. These changes can reduce the 
"downstream" quantities, costs, toxicity and overall environmental impacts of end-of-life 
products that enter the waste stream. 
 
The principles of EPR have helped a growing number of firms adopt successful take-back 
programs. For example, some electronic equipment manufacturers today have discovered that if 
they design their products for easy disassembly and remanufacturing, large cost savings or 
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revenues can be generated by collecting end-of-life products from customers and refurbishing 
them for resale, or by reusing parts in new products. Cost savings and increased revenues can be 
found through the reuse of components, casings, and subassemblies because it is often cheaper to 
reuse than to produce from virgin materials.  These firms have found that as more of a product is 
reused or recycled, less bulk and toxic materials enters the waste stream.  
 
Approaches to EPR Policy Design 
 
Most take-back programs in Europe and other industrialized nations have been stimulated or 
established by legislation, or the threat of legislation. In this section we examine some of the 
approaches to policy development that have been used to accomplish these goals. 
 
There are at least four policy approaches that have been used to promote EPR. The first is 
physical management, where the producer bears the responsibility for physically caring for its 
products, or used products, or the impacts of the products at the end of their life-cycles. This can 
be mandated by government, or adopted voluntarily by producers. The second is economic 
responsibility, where the producer covers all or part of the costs for managing waste at the end of 
its product's life. The third is liability, where the producer is held legally liable for environmental 
damages caused by its product in the production, use or disposal stages. Finally, information 
liability tools have been used, where the producer provides information to the public on the 
affects on the environment or public health that its product may have during various stages of its 
life cycle. 
 
Examples of EPR Policy Instruments  
 
A number of different policy instruments have been used to implement the four EPR policy 
approaches described above. For example: 
 
Voluntary Instruments 
 
• Voluntary Phase-Outs. Consumer awareness and threats of legislation have led some 
companies to voluntarily phase out certain products. 
 
• Voluntary Product Design Changes. Consumer awareness and threats of legislation have led 
some companies to voluntarily redesign their products for better recyclability and reduced 
toxicity.   
 
• Voluntary Agreements Linked with Mandatory Regulations. At times, government mandates 
can be linked with voluntary actions. For example, The Netherlands Packaging Covenant of 
1991 included voluntary agreements to recycle a minimum of 60% of used packaging that could 
not be reused and to recycle 75% of the plastics. 
 
 
 
 
   5 
 
Economic Instruments 
 
• Deposit Refund Schemes. These seek to encourage product reuse. Oregon's bottle bill is an 
example.  
 
• Product Charges. These are used to influence the type of material used in a product and thus 
seek to change the behavior of consumers. For example, Belgium has introduced a tax on PVC 
to shift consumption away from the product because it generates toxic by-products in the 
manufacturing and disposal stages and is impossible to recycle to its original material state. 
 
• Advance Disposal Fees. These are used to cover the costs of disposing of used products. 
They may be paid by producers into a fund that is earmarked for specific uses such as 
environmental cleanup. The consumer may not be aware of the fee. Alternatively, the funds can 
be offered to consumers if they handle end-of-life products in a certain way. For example, 
Sweden has an advanced disposal fee on cars and Austria has one on refrigerators. The refund 
may be more than the original fee to create an added incentive to the consumer to return the used 
product to a specific location and keep it out of the waste stream. 
 
• Virgin Materials Taxes. These seek to discourage the use of certain metals or minerals or old 
growth wood. 
 
• Removing subsidies for virgin materials, which eliminate perverse incentives for their use. 
 
• Product Procurement Policies. These seek to generate markets for products produced in an 
environmentally sustainable manner through design and content requirements. 
 
Regulatory Instruments 
 
• Mandatory Take-Back. These require producers to collect end-of-life products before they 
enter the waste stream. 
 
• Minimum Recycled Content Standards. These dictate the amounts of recycled materials used 
in products. 
 
• Energy Efficiency Standards. These mandate specific levels of energy efficiency in products. 
 
• Disposal Bans And Restrictions. These restrict specific products from entering the waste 
stream. 
 
• Material Bans And Restrictions. These restrict specific types of materials from entering the 
waste stream (e.g. mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium). 
 
• Product Bans And Restrictions. These limit the production and use of specific products. 
 
The choice of policy approach or instrument depends on the product of concern, its 
environmental impacts, and the practicalities of applying an approach to product categories. With 
this information as a backdrop, we investigated a number of government mandated product take-
back programs. 
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Assessment of Selected Take-Back Policies 
 
Industrialized nations have used one or more of the policy approaches described above to require 
or promote EPR. In this section we examine a few of these policies including:  
 
• The EU Directive on Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment as well as electronics 
take-back policies in The Netherlands and Switzerland. 
 
• The Consumer Packaging take-back policies of Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, France.  
 
Case studies of the European Automobile End-of-Life Vehicle take-back policies and The North 
American Nickel Cadmium Battery take-back program can be found in Appendix I of the report.   
 
Tables I and II provide an overview of selected international take-back policies. 
 
Electronics and Electrical Equipment Take-Back Policies 
 
The EU Directive on Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment: This policy aims to 
address a perceived crisis related to the growing amount and toxicity of waste electrical and 
electronic equipment (WEEE). In 1992, 4-6 million tons of 
WEEE was generated in the EU and in 1999 the estimates 
were 5.4 to 6.7 million tons. To resolve these problems, the 
EU directive seeks to promote changes in the design of 
electrical products so that they are composed of less toxic 
materials and can be more easily repaired, upgraded and 
reused, or at least disassembled and recycled in a safer 
manner. 
 
The directive established compulsory targets for collection by 
2006. Between 70% and 95% (by weight) of all collected 
equipment is to be recycled or reused. Incineration for the 
purpose of energy recovery is allowed for 10%-30% of the 
remaining waste. The initial draft directive prohibited the use 
of mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium and brominate 
flame retardants in all electrical goods by the year 2004. Producers must label equipment to 
identify plastic types and the location of all hazardous substances in order to enhance recycling 
and consumer awareness. 
 
The directive places the full financial responsibility on producers to set up and operate collection 
systems and requires that distributors offer to take back the products they sell, as well as similar 
products, free of charge. EU member states must collect information from producers on an 
annual 
Outcomes of the Mandated Vehicle  
Take-Back Program 
As part of proposed legislation that 
requires European automakers to take-
back unwanted automobiles from 
consumers, companies have voluntarily 
agreed to design cars that are 95% 
recyclable by the year 2015, up from 
75% in the past.  The benefits are 
already being realized due to design 
changes to 2000 model cars such as the 
Ford Focus which is 85% recyclable and 
is designed for quick and easy 
dismantling. Without the threat of 
legislation, it is highly unlikely that auto 
manufacturers would have made these 
design changes.   
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Table I.  Waste Electronic and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) Policy Matrix 
 
 
Source: http://www.eorm-rtis.com/sampden.htm 
Measurement 
Criteria 
Denmark Germany The 
Netherlands 
Norway Switzerland 
Regulation 
Name  
(effective date) 
Order #1067 on Mgt. Of 
Waste from Electrical 
and Electronic Products 
(1997) 
Draft 
Ordinance 
Concerning the 
Disposal of 
Information 
Technology 
Equipment 
The Disposal 
of Brown and 
White Goods 
Decree (1998) 
Regulations 
Regarding 
Scrapped 
Electrical and 
Electronics 
Products 
(1999) 
Ordinance on 
the Return, 
Taking Back 
and the 
Disposal of 
Electrical and 
Electronic 
Appliances 
(1998) 
Authority Ministry of 
Environment and 
Energy 
Federal 
Minister for the 
Environment, 
Nature and 
Nuclear Safety  
Ministry of 
Housing, 
Spatial 
Planning and 
Environment 
Ministry of the 
Environment 
Swiss Agency 
for the 
Environment, 
Forests and 
Landscape 
Products 
Covered 
All products dependent 
on internal or external 
power supply 
All IT 
equipment  
Household 
appliances, IT, 
stereos, hot 
water and 
heating 
equipment 
telecom 
equipment 
All products 
reliant on 
electrical 
current for 
function 
Entertainment, 
IT, telecom 
equipment, 
household 
appliances 
Products 
Excluded 
Batteries, refrigeration 
products (covered 
separately) 
Toner and print 
cartridges, CDs 
N/A Batteries, 
refrigeration 
products 
(covered 
separately) 
N/A 
Financial 
Responsibility 
Municipalities/ 
taxpayers 
Manufacturers, 
importers and 
distributors 
Manufacturers, 
importers 
Manufacturers, 
importers 
Manufacturers, 
importers, 
distributors 
Recovery 
Responsibility 
Municipalities Municipalities Producers and 
municipalities 
Producers and 
municipalities 
Producers and 
municipalities 
Recycling 
Targets 
Not specified Not specified 45-75% 
depending on 
product type 
100% 100% 
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basis about the quantity of equipment placed on the market (by numbers and weight). This data 
will be given to the EU Commission by 2003 and every three years after that. 
 
Netherlands Electronic Scrap Take-Back Program.  The Dutch program places almost complete 
responsibility for electronic take-back on manufacturers and importers of electronic products. It 
bans the landfilling and incineration of consumer electronics and large appliances (freezers, 
refrigerators). It set ambitious take-back goals of 100% by the year 2000. The legislation allows 
industry to impose a surcharge on new products to fund the take-back programs. One result was 
that in 1997, the Dutch Association for Information and Communication Technology, a trade 
association, established its own voluntary national take-back program for its members in 
anticipation of the government's decree.  
 
Switzerland's Electronics and Electrical Equipment Take-Back Program.  Due to the rising 
volume of waste electrical and electronic equipment, and the failure of voluntary efforts, in 1998 
the Swiss government required retailers, manufacturers and importers to take back all electrical 
and electronic equipment free of charge and to treat it in "an ecologically sensitive" manner. The 
Swiss estimated that 110,000 tons of electrical and electronic equipment were being discarded 
annually. Voluntary take-back efforts had failed due to problems with free riders (companies that 
did not participate and thus had lower costs). The policy applies to all products, regardless of 
when they were purchased (new sales or 15 years ago). Manufacturers have to take back only 
their own brands, but retailers have to accept any type of product they sell. The government did 
not set recovery targets (requiring all products to be recovered) and left it up to manufacturers to 
figure out how to finance their programs.   
 
Consumer Packaging Take-Back Policies 
 
The Germany 1991 Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste: This ordinance sprang 
from the perceived crisis related to lack of landfill space. It led to the adoption of similar policies 
in The Netherlands, Austria, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and others. Some of 
these nations spread the costs of these policies among local authorities, consumers and 
producers. Germany's policy, however, made manufacturers and distributors responsible for the 
full costs of the consumer packaging they create. The German ordinance is implemented by 
setting government mandated targets for recycling and beverage container refilling. The 
mandated targets have increased over time. For example, in 1999 the targets were 75% of glass, 
70% of tin, 60% of aluminum and cardboard, paper and composites (by weight). The recovery 
rate today is about 65%, which puts Germany at the top in terms of recycling rates among EU 
members. Retailers are required to place bins in their stores so that customers can leave outer 
packaging at the store. Free riders remain a problem as does the lack of consumer education that 
deters full participation by consumers. Under pressure from retailers who objected to this 
mandate, a consortium of 600 companies was formed to license and collect products produced by 
participating firms. The products are given a Green Dot to identify them to consumers. Over 75% 
of all packaging in German stores today carries the Green Dot label. Consumers pay increased 
prices for Green Dot packaging to cover the costs of take-back. This has given manufacturers an 
incentive to reduce packaging quantities and toxicity which lowers costs and allows them to 
remain competitive. 
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Table II.  European Consumer Packaging Take-Back Policy Matrix   
 
                                                 
1 From European Recovery and Recycling Association, http://www.integra.org.uk/about/erra.html  1997 data. 
2 1999 data from Swedish EPA http://www.internat.environ.se/document/press/2000/p000606.htm. 
Measurement 
Criteria 
Germany Netherlands Sweden France 
Producer 
Responsibility 
Organization  
Duales System 
Duetschland (DSD) 
1991 
Committee on 
Packaging and the 
Environment (CPE)  
1991 
Reparegistret 
(REPA) 1994 
Eco-Emballages 
1993 
Collection method Curbside Curbside Consumer collection 
sites 
Curbside 
Financing 
responsibility  
Producer Shared Producer Producer 
Subsidies to: None None None Municipalities, 
guaranteed rates for 
recycled products. 
A.  Factors behind 
implementation 
 
Scarce landfill 
capacity and 
increasing per capita 
waste amounts 
Scarce landfill 
capacity and 
increasing per capita 
waste amounts 
Scarce landfill 
capacity and 
increasing per capita 
waste amounts 
Scarce landfill 
capacity and 
increasing per capita 
waste amounts 
B. Costs to public 
sectors, consumers, 
corporations 
 
OECD estimates 
700DM/tonne of 
municipal waste in 
1994. (US$ 403) 
N/A US$3900/tonne N/A 
C.  Assessment of 
effectiveness1 
 
Recovery rate is 
65%. Germany 
enjoys the highest  
recycling rate in the 
EU- 63%.  
Recovery rate-55% 
Recycling rate-55% 
Recovery rate-73%2 
Recycling rate-58% 
Recovery rate-54% 
Recycling rate-40% 
D.  Barriers to 
success 
Costs of  free riders 
estimated at DM 
400m in 1995.  
Consumer education. 
Consumer education. No curbside pickup. 
Collection centers 
are not accessible 
enough. Consumer 
education. 
No incentive for 
structural change. 
Consumer education. 
E.  Recommended 
improvements 
Reduction in 
incineration 
allowances. 
Increased 
involvement of 
consumer 
organizations.  
Better monitoring of 
transfrontier waste 
movement. 
See above barriers.  
Lower costs 
associated with 
program. 
Reduce reliance on 
incineration and 
introduce market 
forces for upstream 
design changes. 
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The Netherlands Consumer Packaging Take-Back policy shares the costs among producers, 
municipalities and the national government. As with the German, Swedish and French programs, 
it was created due to the perceived crisis related to the growing amount of packaging waste and 
scarce landfill capacity. The recovery rate in the Netherlands is 55% as is the rate of recycling. 
Due to their take-back policy, the rate of recovery of packaging in Sweden is 73% and the 
recycling rate is 58%. The producers bear the costs for the program here. The Swedish 
government claims that the lack of accessible collection centers, lack of consumer education, and 
lack of curbside pickup prevents the program from being more effective. The French packaging 
policies place the responsibility for take-back on the producers, although subsidies are provided 
to municipalities to manage the program. The recovery rate in France is 54% and the recycling 
rate is 40%. The major problem seems to be the lack of incentive for making structural changes 
in product design, delivery and collection systems.  
 
Summary of Economic and Environmental Costs and Benefits  
 
Because of their relative youthfulness, it is difficult to assess the economic costs and benefits of 
take-back policies. It appears as though policies that establish a financial incentive for product 
design changes generate the greatest benefits. A good example can be found by comparing the 
French and Dutch consumer packaging mandates.  The French program requires producers to 
join an organization that subsidizes the collection of the waste by municipal authorities.  
However, low landfill tipping fees have failed to give producers an incentive to reduce packaging 
content. The quantity of packaging waste ending up in landfills has consequently not been 
reduced.3 On the other hand, the Dutch program imposes taxes on the packaging manufacturer 
according to the per-unit weight and the composition of the packaging.  Hence, the more that 
economic incentives are built into mandated take-back programs, the more likely they are to 
succeed.   
 
In terms of the overall costs or benefits to society, studies with different methodologies and 
assumptions end up with widely divergent conclusions. An example is the discrepancy in 
estimated costs between the German and Swedish consumer packaging programs.  A recent study 
by professor Marian Radetzki at Lulea University of Technology in Sweden claims that the total 
cost to society for the recycling of packaging waste amounts to U.S.$3,900/ton. However, a 1994 
study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of the German 
Green Dot system calculated that recycling packaging costs are around DM700 or U.S.$403/ton.4  
This huge discrepancy indicates the difficulties in comparing studies conducted with disparate 
methodologies.   
 
Similarly, lack of cost-benefit data from the government agencies that administer mandated take-
back programs makes it difficult to assess the costs to the public.   
 
Nevertheless, the fact that an increasing number of national and local governments in Europe, 
Asia and elsewhere are adopting take-back policies suggests that they believe the programs 
already are cost effective or will be over the long run. More research is required to fully 
understand the economics involved.   
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The environmental data we found suggests that while there were start-up problems, many of the 
European take-back policies today are producing environmental benefits. For example, 
Germany's packaging ordinance originally generated a huge amount of recyclable waste that 
initially had to be exported or dumped in developing nations. Today, however, the ordinance has 
reduced per capita packaging use, from 94.7 kg in 1992 to 83.2 kg in 1997. The 13% drop 
compares to a 15% increase in per capita packaging use in the U.S. over the same time frame. In 
addition, the proportion of refillable beverage containers sold in Germany has increased. 
Packaging used in the transportation industries has seen the largest reduction by developing 
reusable shipping containers. The original German packaging ordinance specifically prohibited 
incineration, but this was changed in 1998 to allow energy recycling under strict conditions that 
waste must be used as a substitute fuel and not simply as a waste disposal method. While there 
are 57 incinerators in Germany today, only 2-3 can fulfill this requirement. 
 
However, more long-term research is needed to determine the EPR policies lead to product and 
process designs that actually reduce the quantity and toxicity of waste over the long term. For 
example, research is needed to determine if the WEEE policies will extend the use and reuse of 
electronic products (thus reducing the production of toxic, material and energy intensive 
products) or simply to lead to more recycling (which may perpetuate the production of resource 
intensive and toxic products).  
   
Case Studies of Voluntary U.S. Corporate Take-Back Programs 
 
Although most European take-back programs were initiated by government legislation or the 
threat of legislation, the few major take-back programs that exist in the U.S. have been adopted 
voluntarily by major corporations. In this section we examine a number of voluntary U.S. product 
take-back programs. More information can be found in Appendix II of the report. All of the case 
studies we looked at reported that they broke even or found significant cost savings as well as 
environmental benefits from their programs. This is particularly true with original information 
technology equipment manufacturers. Asset recovery and remanufacturing has become an 
essential part of the business strategy of many of these firms.   
 
Our analysis uncovered a number of key drivers of successful voluntary corporate take-back 
programs. We also found a number of barriers that constrain program success. These are outlined 
in Table III. Perhaps the most important drivers are the economic benefits resulting from the 
residual value of the equipment that is recaptured for reuse and the ability to use product take-
back as a marketing tool, and the desire to be better 
environmental stewards.  
 
Economic Benefits: Five of the seven companies we 
interviewed for this assessment stated that a key driver for 
the development of their programs was the potential cost 
savings, and business or marketing benefits the programs 
could achieve. To make a program financially viable, the 
assets being recovered through voluntary take-back 
programs must have some book or market value. Voluntary 
take-back programs are most often only found in situations 
where the returned assets, such as cameras and newer 
information technology equipment, have non-negligible 
asset values. To achieve this, companies often initiate 
product design changes to increase the value of their end-of-
life goods.  For example, a three-year old computer that is 
returned to Dell Computers Inc. upon the expiration of a 
lease has significant book and market values.  Dell has incorporated p
make remanufacturing more efficient.  Dell’s design for disassembly 
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Inexpensive, remanufactured components recovered from products at the end of their leases can 
be used to fulfill warrantees and maintenance agreements on existing product lines.  In addition, 
the seller of the function may be able to profit from the implied, internal interest rate on the lease 
of the product.  Finally, both the buyer and the seller of the product-based function may also 
realize tax benefits from leasing rather than buying.   
 
It was difficult to obtain exact cost-saving data from the firms we interviewed. However, Saturn 
Automotive, FujiFilm, Kodak, Hewlett-Packard, Pitney Bowes and Xerox described their cost-
savings as either "break even" or "substantial." Pitney-
Bowes saved $8.2 million from reused parts in 1998. Xerox 
saves approximately $200 million a year from their product 
take-back program. 
 
Environmental Stewardship Benefits:  Four of the seven 
companies we interviewed for this assessment stated that a 
key driver for their program was a desire to be better 
environmental stewards. For some, such as FujiFilm, this 
resulted from a desire to avoid criticism stemming from the 
waste previously generated by their single use cameras. For 
others, such as Dell Computers and Hewlett-Packard 
Company, being good environmental stewards has been part 
of company standards for years.  
 
The commitments these companies have made to the 
environment appear to be impressive. Saturn now retrieves 
10% of replaced bumpers, FujiFilm collects more than 
100% of the "single use" cameras they sell (the excess are 
imported cameras), Kodak recovers and reuses 90% of their camera
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Table III.  U.S. Corporate Voluntary Take-Back Program Matrix   
 
 
 Saturn 
Automotive  
FujiFilm Kodak Dell Hewlett-Packard Pitney-Bowes Xerox 
Factors 
encouraging 
adoption of 
Product Take-
Back Program 
 
Environmental 
stewardship 
Environmental 
stewardship 
Environmental 
stewardship 
and cost 
savings.              
 
 
Marketing 
tool. 
Cost savings, 
customer 
satisfaction, and 
business 
development 
Cost savings. Environmental 
stewardship 
Economic 
Assessment 
 
"Cost 
Savings"- 
exact figure 
N/A. 
“Economically 
Beneficial”-exact 
figure N/A. 
“Substantial”-
exact figure 
N/A. 
Viewed as 
an essential 
part of its 
sales 
strategy and 
is financed 
by sales of 
new units-
exact figure 
N/A. 
Break-even on 
demanufacturing 
segment. 
1998 savings 
from reused 
parts was $8.2 
million 
Approximately 
$200 million a 
year. 
Assessment of 
effectiveness 
 
Retrieving 10% 
of replaced 
bumpers 
110% of cameras 
sold are returned. 
(excess is 
imported 
cameras) 
90% of camera 
by weight is 
recovered and 
reused. 
Dell feels its 
service is 
being 
underutilized 
by its 
customers. 
No recovered 
materials are 
sent to landfills. 
Products have 
been 
improved 
through 
remanufacturi
ng process. 
N/A 
Barriers to 
success 
Technical 
barriers in the 
form of paint 
and other 
contaminants 
on  
the returned 
bumpers. 
Third parties 
who illegally 
reload Fuji’s 
cameras. 
Third party 
reloaders and 
customer 
participation. 
N/A Ill defined 
burden sharing 
among 
participants. 
Expenses 
associated 
with parts 
testing, 
customer 
perceptions, 
sales 
competition 
w/ new 
products. 
Customer 
perceptions. 
Recommended 
improvements 
Expand the 
scope of the 
take 
back program. 
Closing the 
environmental 
loop by recycling 
retrieved cases 
into new cases. 
Lowering of 
the legal 
barriers to the 
transboundary 
shipment of 
waste 
electronics. 
N/A Above, plus 
improved 
reverse logistics. 
Delay in ISO 
14000 
standards 
governing the 
use of 
harvested 
parts in new 
products. 
N/A 
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Key Issues and Constraints of Voluntary Take-Back Programs 
 
If product take-back programs are so economically and environmentally beneficial, why don't 
more producers engage in the practices? Some of the answers can be found by examining the 
barriers that constrain effective take-back programs. 
 
Based on our interviews and research, it appears as though one of the largest barriers to voluntary 
take-back programs is the cost associated with reverse logistics. This means the collection, 
sorting and transportation of end-of-life goods to a disposition center for processing.  For 
example, when dealing with cameras that weigh only grams, reverse logistics are simple.  
However, the logistics of collecting end-of-life autos that weigh tons and cannot be moved easily 
are much more difficult. Yet, solutions to these problems have been found. Dell and Saturn, for 
example, use the trucks that haul products to vendors to bring recovered products back to 
distribution centers.  Pitney-Bowes hires a third party contractor to make regional sweeps to 
retrieve equipment.  European packaging and electrical programs subsidize the existing 
municipal pickup systems.  In addition, sophisticated reverse supply chain management computer 
models are available to help design this process.   Whatever method is used, the successful 
programs attempt to capitalize on economies of scale to reduce per unit collection and 
transportation costs.   
 
Another obstacle to an effective voluntary take-back program is consumer bias.  Consumers have 
shown an aversion to refurbished goods, believing they are inferior to new products. Part of this 
bias may be due to problems consumers have had with inferior refurbished goods sold by low 
quality remanufacturers, which are often located overseas.  Each of the companies we surveyed 
said that they subjected all of the refurbish assets to extensive product testing to ensure reliability 
(e.g. Xerox, HP, Pitney-Bowes, Kodak, etc.). Yet, this often does not convince consumers. Until 
the bias by consumers can be overcome, a lower demand for remanufactured goods may result in 
downward price pressures.  Lower revenues can jeopardize the long-term viability of any product 
line.  One potential way to address this barrier is to get independent third parties to test 
refurbished products against new products and to heavily promote the results in terms of quality 
and durability to consumers. 
 
Still another obstacle to effective take-back programs can be existing regulations.  For example, 
the development of the North American rechargeable battery take-back program was hindered by 
EPA hazardous waste rules that imposed stringent hazardous waste handling procedures on 
rechargeable batteries.  The take-back program was initiated only after Congress passed the 
Universal Waste Rule in 1996 that excluded rechargeable batteries from hazardous waste 
handling requirements.  Similar problems exist in the single-use-camera industry that is being 
hampered by the Basel Ban on trans-national shipments of hazardous wastes.  Because some 
cameras contain flash batteries that are considered hazardous waste in some countries, 
manufacturers are unable to consolidate the collection and demanufacturing of these cameras 
despite the fact that the cameras contain non-hazardous alkaline batteries. In Europe, the inability 
to combine multiple national programs into regional programs increased per unit recovery costs 
and hurt the economic viability of the operation.  To resolve this problem governments must be 
responsive to industry desires to establish take-back programs.  The problems with the Universal 
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Waste Rule resulted in significant quantities of cadmium entering the waste stream that might 
have been diverted under the take-back program.   
Concerns about free riders are also a barrier. Firms are often wary about being required to adopt 
new practices or charge increased fees if competitors can somehow avoid these costs. 
Government must ensure a level playing field for all sectors and firms within an industry for EPR 
policies to succeed.  
 
Finally, inappropriate subsidies for the mining, production and use of virgin resources can create 
major barriers. Outdated or poorly planned subsidies make it appear that virgin materials are 
cheaper to use than reused or recycled feedstocks. However, the cost differences are usually 
related to the fact that many direct and indirect costs have been transferred to the public rather 
than being borne by the developer (i.e. they have been "externalized'). When the true costs are 
externalized rather than being borne by the actual producers, inaccurate price signals are sent 
through the economy of the true costs of product development, use and disposal. This 
undermines the effectiveness of EPR programs.  
 
Key Issues For EPR Policy and Program Design in the Pacific Northwest 
 
Based on our research, it appears EPR policies and programs could make a significant 
contribution to the development of a more environmentally sustainable economy in the Pacific 
Northwest. To accomplish this, however, a number of technical, practical, market related and 
political issues must be resolved. 
  
Technical Design Issues: If EPR policies are to be adopted in the Pacific Northwest, one of the 
first issues that must be resolved is the desired outcome of the policies. Is the goal to encourage 
producers to redesign and detoxify their products? Is it to encourage producers to manage their 
products at the end of their life-cycle? Is it to shift the costs of waste management to producers as 
a way to reduce costs or generate increased revenues? Is it to save scare landfill space or keep 
hazardous materials out of the waste stream? The answers to these questions will lead to different 
types of policy approaches and instruments.  
 
A related question is whether or not EPR policies are the best way to achieve the chosen goals. 
One could argue, for example, that if the goals of EPR policies are to save increasingly scarce 
landfill space and to keep hazardous materials out of landfills, these problems could be better 
resolved by either using market mechanisms (e.g. simply raising the costs of landfilling) or by 
banning certain products or hazardous materials in consumer products. For example, the use of 
aluminum in single use (disposable) drink cartons, as well as PVC and heavy metals such as lead, 
mercury and cadmium in many products generates hazardous emissions throughout a product's 
manufacturing, use and disposal stages. Banning these substances could be a more effective and 
safer method for preventing the release of these substances into nature. Before enacting EPR 
policies in the Northwest, information is needed to demonstrate that EPR policies are a more 
effective way to address these issues than market mechanisms or product/substance bans. 
  
Another key issue is the question of which parties are actually the "producers." Many consumer 
products are composed of numerous parts produced by different manufacturers that are 
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assembled and sold by yet another company. Many others are assembled overseas and imported. 
Still others may be upgraded or reconditioned and put back on the market (e.g. upgraded 
computers). In these cases, who exactly is the producer? The question of which parties are 
responsible must be resolved before any effective policy can be designed.  
 
The issue of who should pay for the collection and recovery of products is an important one.  The 
funding strategy will be closely related to the determination of the parties responsible. For 
example, will the program be funded by deposits paid by consumers; by mandatory contributions 
by producers to escrow accounts when a product is placed on the market; by some type of legally 
binding guarantee from the manufacturer or importer to handle take-back; or by some other 
method?  One strongly held view in Europe is that the last consumer should be able to return 
end- of-life products at collection facilities free of charge. Otherwise, few people will take the 
effort to return end-of-life products. When this principle is followed, the original consumer, 
manufacturer or importer must pay the costs. It will be important to review the history and 
success of deposit schemes such as those related to the Bottle Bill in Oregon to determine the 
funding strategy most likely to succeed in the Pacific Northwest. 
 
The type of waste diversion allowed under a policy is also a key issue. Will producers be able to 
collect end-of-life products and ship them overseas to countries with few environmental policies 
and cheap labor forces? Will they be required to treat the products domestically? The answers to 
these and other similar questions will go a long way to determining the economic, social and 
environmental consequences of EPR policies. 
 
The measurement system used to determine the success of EPR policies will be vital to their 
development. How will government know if policies are achieving their intended outcomes? One 
approach is to set collection and recovery targets. Yet, at least in the early going of new policies, 
it is often difficult to know what targets may be achievable. In addition, if targets are set, local, 
regional and even national databases must be developed. This, in turn, will mean that 
government must require that manufactures or their trade associations keep detailed records. This 
may not only add additional costs, but unless some standard protocols are adopted, it may lead to 
different measurement systems and reporting requirements between government units and the 
private sector. This question deserves considerable thought. 
 
Consumer Participation Issues: Lack of effective consumer education is a significant barrier to 
successful product take-back policies. Nearly every take-back program that relies on consumer 
participation to succeed, reported unsatisfactory consumer education on recycling and 
environmental issues as a major barrier. For example, due to lack of knowledge and other factors, 
consumers do not adequately recycle nickel cadmium batteries in the U.S. in spite of established 
take-back policies and programs and do not participate in free computer take-back programs 
when offered in Europe. On the other hand, Oregon has had ample success with returns related to 
the Bottle Bill. Consumer education is a complex, costly process that requires continual effort. 
Before any EPR policies are adopted in the Northwest, carefully developed and well-funded 
consumer education programs will be needed.  
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Market and Competitiveness Issues:  The oversupply of, or lack of demand for, recycled goods 
that may arise from successful EPR policies are significant barriers that must be addressed before 
any effective policies can be developed. Take-back policies can create a glut of recycled products 
flooding the market at once. An oversupply can cause a decline in market prices hampering asset 
recovery efforts and effectively lowering the residual value of the recovered product. This 
happened in Germany in the early 1990s when its Green Dot packaging program created tons of 
surplus plastic that had to be exported or stored due to a lack of domestic processing ability for 
this commodity.5  Germany later changed the provisions of the program to allow for more 
incineration instead of recycling.  Although European take-back policies for computers and 
electrical equipment are still in their early stages, it is possible that a similar outcome could occur 
here as well.  There are policy options to address this issue. For example, the French packaging 
program ensures recyclers a guaranteed price for their products. Other strategies have focused on 
increasing the market demand for these goods by offering research grants and subsidizing the 
development of reused, remanufactured and recycled goods markets. It will be vital to know that 
markets exist for collected products before enacting any major take-back policies in the Pacific 
Northwest. 
 
In addition, some industries that produce consumer goods for worldwide markets have argued 
that the European policies create an uneven playing field. They claim that having to produce 
products in one manner for the European markets and in another manner for other markets may 
drive costs up so high that some producers are forced out of business. The data does not seem to 
support these claims so far, however, as we could find no evidence that firms have gone under 
due to the European policies.  
 
However, EPR policies could place small and mid-sized producers and importers at a 
competitive disadvantage in the Pacific Northwest. Larger firms may have the technical 
knowledge, local infrastructure and financial and human resources needed to successfully 
navigate the complex regulatory waters created by EPR policies, while small or fledgling firms or 
importers without those resources may not. Great care must be given to design technical and 
financial assistance programs to ensure that EPR policies do not end up favoring large producers 
over small firms or importers.  
 
European take-back policies may also be creating a competitive disadvantage for U.S. firms due 
to the increasing sophistication that European firms involved with product take-back are 
developing compared to their U.S. counterparts. The OECD notes that “…significant refinements 
have been made in all recycling technologies as a result of increased recycling requirements 
under the Packaging Ordinance…”6 Industries such as auto dismantling and plastic recycling are 
receiving considerable attention and investment because Europeans view recycling as an 
important source of jobs for low skilled labor working for certified recyclers.  Clean Production 
Action, an environmental training organization, notes that recycling one million tons of solid 
waste leads to 1600 jobs, landfilling the same waste leads to 600 jobs, and incinerating the waste 
leads to only 80 jobs.7  
 
In addition, since the U.S. is not a party to the Basel Ban, the U.S. exports tons of waste electrical 
and electronic equipment (WEEE) to developing countries such as India each year for 
demanufacturing by low wage labor.  As parties to the Ban, European states have had to develop 
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an infrastructure to demanufacture and recycle these hazardous goods while the U.S. continues to 
export its waste to nations with low labor costs.  The increased investment in product take-back 
systems in Europe could lead to a competitive disadvantage for U.S. companies should the move 
towards environmental stewardship and sustainability in this country continue to accelerate. 
 
Finally, despite the potential for creating competitive disadvantages, many Northwest firms 
export goods to Western Europe and Asia. These firms must maintain their ability to compete by 
changing product design, delivery and collection systems to respond to take-back regulations in 
these locations. This fact alone should encourage government to assist Northwest firms to learn 
about and apply take-back programs. 
 
 
Political Issues:  Perhaps the most important political barrier to the development of EPR policies 
in the Pacific Northwest is lack of a perceived crisis. The only national take-back policy in the 
U.S. was driven by the enactment of policies in a number of states mandating the take-back of 
Nickel Cadmium batteries by manufacturers. The absence of any other national take-back policy 
in the U.S. is at least in part due to the fact that a sense of crisis does not exist yet. Many 
Northwest states still believe that they have sufficient landfill capacity available to meet their 
waste management needs. In addition, while the majority of streams do not meet Clean Water 
Act standards and the effects of global climate change are becoming more apparent, there is still 
no sense of crisis over the disposal of hazardous materials and substances. This is beginning to 
change, however. A growing number of eastern U.S. states are running out of environmentally 
safe landfill sites and shifting to incineration to dispose of their waste.8  Sixteen states have 
already banned white goods (refrigerators, washers, dryers) from their landfills. Lane County, 
Oregon, and other regions in the Pacific Northwest are also beginning to find environmentally 
safe landfill sites an issue and are looking for alternatives. 
 
Finally, the problems related to reverse logistics, consumer bias against reuse and recycled 
products, the costs to producers of redesigning their products and processes, and the fears of an 
uneven playing field will often generate opposition to EPR policies from industry in the region. 
Some industries have been known to favor "extended stakeholder responsibility" rather than  
producer responsibility. Governments may have to provide technical and financial assistance, tax 
relief and other incentives to help producers transition to take-back schemes in order to garner 
sufficient support from industry to enact effective EPR policies.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Given the extensive land base of the Pacific Northwest, it is unlikely that the majority of 
communities in the region will soon believe that a crisis is near at hand related to lack of landfill 
capacity.  Nevertheless, the trends described in the introduction of this report can already be 
observed in the region. For example, concerns are rising about the availability of landfill sites 
that will not harm habitat for species listed under the Endangered Species Act, or add to pollution 
in Water Quality Limited streams. There is also growing concern about the increasing toxicity of 
the waste stream and the potential for the leaching of hazardous materials into groundwater and 
the food chain. Between 1997 and 2004, over 315 million computers will have become obsolete 
in the U.S. alone, representing up to 1.2 billion pounds of lead and many other toxic compounds 
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entering the waste stream.9  Finally, there are increasing concerns about the level of financial and 
management responsibility local communities should bear for waste disposal and about the rising 
costs associated with managing the waste stream. These trends are likely to generate increased 
support for some type of ERP policies or landfill bans for hazardous products such as electrical 
equipment and white goods.  
 
Changes are already occurring here. A decade ago few major product take-back policies or 
programs existed in the U.S. with the exception of beverage packaging laws, or bottle bills.  
Today however, voluntary product take-back programs are growing in the information 
technology industry and are becoming more common in other industries because of the value 
they add to a business. Support for EPR policies to expand these practices throughout key 
industries is certain to grow.  
 
EPR programs and policies have already generated significant cost savings for some firms and a 
number of industrialized nations claim that EPR policies generate environmental benefits and 
savings for taxpayers. If the design, market and political barriers discussed in this report can be 
resolved, it appears as though EPR policies and practices can make a major contribution to the 
development of a more environmentally sustainable regional economy while also saving 
companies and taxpayers potentially millions of dollars.  
 
By outlining the principles, policies and practices of EPR, and by examining a number of policy 
and company case studies, we hope this report provides a platform for further examination of the 
potential application of EPR and product take-back programs in the Pacific Northwest.   
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END-OF-LIFE VEHICLE (ELV) TAKE BACK POLICIES 
erman ELV Take-Back Policies 
erman and importing automakers agreed to a voluntary take-back initiative in 1996.  The 
luntary pledge includes setting up an infrastructure of certified dismantlers, recycling end-of-
e vehicles from their last owners free of charge, and goals for the reduction of auto shredder 
sidue (ASR) sent to landfills from 25% currently to 5% by 2015.  Included in the agreement is 
e requisite re-design of autos to be recycled and reused more readily according to design for 
cycling criteria. 
.  Factors Behind Implementation 
erman automakers were responding to proposed legislation by the German government that 
ould have held manufacturers explicitly responsible for their products.  In addition to imposing 
rict take-back requirements for ELVs, the German “scrap car rule” would have mandated 
cycling and reuse quotas.  The rule also required automakers to incorporate eco-design schemes 
 facilitate ease of dismantling and identification of recyclable components creating a genuine 
hole-vehicle feedback loop. 
.  Costs to Public Sectors, Consumers, Corporations 
y agreeing to develop an industry sponsored operating procedure, carmakers avoided a potential 
erous regulatory burden.   
.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
he agreement has been criticized as it allows for the incineration of Auto Shredded Residue 
SR) for energy recovery prior to going to landfills.  This loophole allows automakers to avoid 
e goals by burning excess ASR.  
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Netherlands ELV Take-Back Policies 
 
The Dutch take-back system for ELVs evolved from the German scrap car rule.  Carmakers, 
working in concert with the government, have developed a system of  recycling cars through 
coordinated efforts of auto dismantlers, collectors and recyclers.10  The Auto Recycling 
Nederlands (ARN) system is funded by a waste disposal fee of 150 NLG on new automobiles 
sold and on any imported autos.  Owners of ELVs consequently do not have to pay for the 
disposal costs associated with their autos.  Targets for recycling range from 86% in 2000 to 95% 
by 2015. 
 
A.  Factors Behind Implementation 
Similar legislation in Germany and France led to the development of the ARN.  Concern over the 
availability of landfills to deposit auto shredder residue (ASR) is a motivating factor in all 
European ELV activity. 
 
B.  Costs to Public Sectors, Consumers, Corporations 
The burden for the funding of ARN falls entirely on the purchasers and importers of new 
automobiles.  The 150 NLG waste disposal fee generated over 97 million NLG income in 1999 
while total expenditures for the program were only 49 million, generating 57 million toward the 
reserve fund which now contains 309 million NLG.  
 
C.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
The program appears to be highly effective compared to countries without ELV systems.  
Compared with the 75% recycling rate (by weight) of ELVs in the U.S., the Dutch program 
expects an 86% rate in 2000, the target set by the auto industry.  Similarly, 89% of all ELVs 
entered the ARN program in 1999 totaling 251,943 vehicles. 
 
D.  Barriers to Success 
The shift towards more plastics and polymers in new vehicles has made recycling more difficult.  
Similarly, the increase in the incidence of airbags, seatbelt tensioners and air conditioners will 
result in higher dismantling and regular costs. 
 
E.  Future Improvements 
Although the industry has set an ambitious goal of 95% recyclability by 2015, the program 
allows 10% of the recycled amount to be achieved through incineration with energy recovery.  
Barring changes in vehicle design that would facilitate greater recycling content, apparently the 
only way to meet the targets is by incineration. 
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French ELV Take-Back Policies 
 
The French system focuses on improvements in car design and dismantling tools for the existing 
labor intensive, manual-dismantling approach as opposed to the German and Dutch approach, 
which incorporates mechanized dismantling.11   The French government views the auto- 
dismantling sector as an important source of employment for unskilled labor in France. 
 
A.  Factors Behind Implementation 
The French posit the motivating factor behind the adoption of the Agreement on the Treatment of 
End of Life Vehicles was the government's lead in coordinating EU policy on priority waste 
streams.  French car manufacturers and importers responded to the threat of legislation and the 
“threat” posed by the German approach.  
 
B.  Costs to Public Sectors, Consumers, Corporations 
The goal of the Agreement was to increase the recyclability of French automobiles.  The costs of 
redesigning autos to increase the ease of dismantling, sorting according to ISO 14001 labels, and 
choosing recycling friendly materials have yet to be quantified.  The most obvious costs have 
fallen on the dismantlers and shredders who have decided to become certified.  The large cost 
associated with certification (400-1.5m FF) makes the return on investment questionable.  
  
D.  Barriers to Success 
The French certification program for ELV dismantlers has been running behind schedule. As of 
1996 only 3-4% of dismantlers were certified.  Insurance companies and dealer networks have 
stated they will only deal with certified auto dismantlers and shredders.  Until a critical mass of 
certified dismantlers and shredders is developed that will enable insurance companies and dealers 
to ensure environmentally sound disposal of cars, the system will not operate as planned. 
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EUROPEAN CONSUMER PACKAGING POLICIES 
 
Consumer packaging waste represented approximately one third (by weight) of the German 
municipal solid waste stream in 1991.12  Given the scarce disposal capacity available to European 
countries, it is no surprise that one of the earliest take-back programs targeted this area.  The 
German Green Dot program, initiated under the Ordinance on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste 
(1991) mandates that producers and manufacturers of consumer goods are responsible for the 
costs of managing packaging waste after consumers are done with it.  In most countries, industry 
must pay for the collecting, sorting and reuse or recycling of these materials.   The systems are 
financed by fees on packaging according to material composition and weight and is paid for by 
packaging producers and administered by a producer responsibility organization (PRO). The 
system originally mandated aggressive recycling quotas for materials without allowing 
incineration for energy recovery.  Without sufficient demand for the recycled products, Germany 
was forced to export much of its recycled waste. 
 
While most European states have packaging take-back programs, we examined Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and France.  The first three are included because of their importance or 
controversy, while France is examined due to its relative inefficiency.  Germany, The 
Netherlands and Sweden have the most progressive policies that aim to influence structural 
change on the firm level.  By imposing fees based on packaging weight and composition, firms 
are encouraged to minimize the weight and volume of individual packages, make packaging be 
refillable, and use environmentally sound materials.  These policies attempt to couple product 
and waste policies to minimize landfilled material.  According to the OECD, the Dutch require 
use of Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) and Market Economic Analysis (MEA) by packaging 
producers.  This has resulted in many innovative adaptations in packaging but more importantly 
this process has increased cooperation between all links in a product chain, and results in 
improved insights into the cost structure of an enterprise.13   
 
The focus on source reduction of packaging waste should ultimately be more successful than the 
method employed by the French.  The French system does not rely on LCA/MEA to reduce 
upstream waste.  Instead, its low fees are set by industry and are used to subsidize municipal 
waste treatment systems that collect and sort the waste.  The fees do not cover the full costs of 
treatment and elimination of waste.  In addition, the French rely heavily on waste incineration in 
its waste policy and this reliance has affected recycling efforts negatively. 
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WASTE ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT (WEEE)  
TAKE-BACK POLICIES 
 
End-of-life computers, cell phones, TVs and other electronics have become a major waste 
management issue in industrialized countries and the problem is worsening.  The National Safety 
Council estimates that by 2007 there will be almost 500 million obsolete computers in the U.S. 
alone.  Coupled with the expanding cell phone market and VCRs made obsolete by DVDs, 
environmentally sound disposal practices for WEEE should be in great demand. Electronic 
equipment contains many toxins and heavy metals that leach into groundwater if disposed in 
landfills and produce carcinogenic dioxins if incinerated.  Already, the five or more pounds of 
lead in computer screens and TVs account for 40% of all the lead in U.S. landfills.14 
 
Most of the policies examined here entail the producer being responsible for the collection, 
sorting and environmentally sound disposal of electrical equipment with the exception of 
Denmark, which lays the burden on municipal authorities.15  Given the recent evolution of these 
policies, environmental and economic assessment of their effectiveness has not been 
forthcoming.  Most of the policies ensure that the consumer will not have to pay a fee to dispose 
of the equipment.  If the consumer is buying a replacement product from a retailer, then the 
retailer can impose a hidden disposal fee on the old product. 
  
Denmark 
 
Statutory order No.1067 on Management of Waste from Electrical and Electronic Products 
states that virtually all electrical waste will be collected and treated by local authorities. 
Collection sites include retailers and central collection sites. The order gives local authorities the 
main responsibility for recovering WEEE from all sources.  The system is funded through local 
authorities. The estimated total cost of implementing the law is about DKr5 (US$ 0.70)  per kilo, 
equivalent to total costs of DKr104m (US$ 15m). Household waste taxes will rise by DKr50 
(US$ 7) per year to help fund recovery.  
 
Germany 
 
Germany has drafted legislation called the Draft Ordinance Concerning the Disposal of 
Information Technology Equipment (1998) that would cover the take-back of Information 
Technology (IT) equipment including PCs, photocopiers, printers, scanners and communication 
equipment.  Producers (manufacturers, distributors and importers) must take-back their brand of 
electronics free of charge from the customer.  Producers may charge a fee for equipment sold 
prior to the enactment date.  Municipalities will be responsible for the collection and storage of 
equipment. 
 
The Netherlands 
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The Disposal of Brown and White Goods Decree (effective June 1, 1998) requires manufacturers 
and importers to take back old electrical equipment free of charge when consumers purchase new 
ones regardless of brand name (until 2005 when producers are required to take-back only their 
own brands).   Retailers take back end-of-life products from consumers and can then sell them or 
return these items to the municipality, manufacturer or importer.  The manufacturer or importer 
must pay for the cost of the disposal.  Municipalities will be responsible for collection from 
households and suppliers. 
 
Norway 
 
The Norwegian Regulations Regarding Scrapped Electrical and Electronic Products (effective 
June 1, 1998) require retailers and municipalities to accept waste equipment from consumers free 
of charge.  Manufacturers and importers are held responsible for the collection, treatment and 
transportation to a certified treatment center for demanufacturing/recycling.  Municipalities must 
accept WEEE from households and can finance this through a levy on waste disposal fees. 
 
Switzerland 
 
The Swiss Ordinance on the Return, the Taking Back and the Disposal of Electrical and 
Electronic Appliances (effective July, 1998).  This ordinance mandates that retailers, 
manufacturers, and importers take-back end-of-life electrical equipment free of charge from 
consumers and dispose of it in an environmentally sound way.  Consumers can drop off 
appliances at retailers, a disposal facility, or at an industry collection site.  Manufacturers and 
importers are responsible for the cost of recycling. 
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NORTH AMERICAN TAKE-BACK POLICIES 
 
The current rechargeable battery program was established in 1995 to collect and recycle batteries 
in North America.  Collection centers have been set up at retail sites, businesses and public 
agencies, communities and industry recycling centers for consumers to deposit Nickel Cadmium 
(Ni-Cd) batteries that are shipped to independent contractor recycling facilities.  The program is 
paid for by industry license fees that most major battery and product manufacturers subscribe to. 
 
A. Factors Behind Implementation 
The Universal Waste Rule (1995) eliminated some regulatory hurdles to the collection and 
recycling of batteries that under certain conditions were classified as hazardous waste.  The 
Mercury Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act (1996) made the Universal 
Waste Rule apply to all 50 states and was sponsored by the battery industry which sought to 
universalize the myriad of state legislation (driven mainly by New Jersey and Minnesota) that 
required manufacturers to take back rechargeable batteries at their own expense for disposal or 
recycling.  As a result, the battery industry association established the Rechargeable Battery 
Recycling Corporation (RBRC) to conduct the battery take-back process.  Its mandate is to 
educate the public on battery recycling and to collect and recycle Nickel Cadmium (Ni-Cd) 
batteries whose cadmium component is toxic to humans and wildlife, and needs to be eliminated 
from the solid waste stream for environmental reasons.16 
 
B.  Costs to Public Sectors, Consumers, Corporations 
The program is voluntary and is funded by license fees from battery and product manufacturers 
who join the RBRC and are able to place the RBRC seal on their product.  The owner of the 
brand name on the battery is generally the licensee and the owner of the brand name of the 
product would be a sub licensee.  However, the costs to collect, transport, administrate and 
recycle the batteries are ultimately impounded into the price of the battery or product and passed 
on to the consumer.  By internalizing the costs of disposal into the purchase price, the burden of 
end-of-life product disposal shifts from municipalities and solid waste treatment operators to the 
consumer.   
 
C.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
RBRC estimates recycling rates of spent Ni-Cd batteries.  They estimate that in 1998 25% of 
end-of-life Ni-Cd batteries were recycled.   The industry (RBRC and for profit organizations) 
recycled 3.7 million pounds of batteries in 1998 in North America, up from 2.7 million in 1995. 
 
D.  Barriers to Success 
Voluntary programs such as RBRC’s could be bothered by free-riders, companies who sell 
products without paying the license fees.  RBRC claims that this is not a major issue, with over 
90% of battery manufacturers, resellers and marketers enrolled as licensees in the program.  
Participation could grow to higher levels as RBRC plans to expand its battery coverage on 
January 1, 2001 to include Lithium-Ion and Nickel Metal Hydride as well as Ni-Cd batteries. 
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However, consumer action on recycling issues remains a formidable obstacle.  A study paid for 
by RBRC shows that although 56% of portable product owners know about recycling their 
batteries, only 16% say they recycle rechargeable batteries.17 
 
E.  Future Improvements 
One proposed improvement for the program is better training at retail stores who are collection 
centers for the program.  Many customers bring the old batteries in to find exact replacements, 
but end up taking the spent battery home because overworked store employees do not remind 
them about the recycling bin.18  Battery deposits are sometimes recommended as a way to 
increase recycling rates, although automotive batteries have achieved a 95% recycling success 
rate despite the fact only 12 states have mandatory deposits schemes in place.   
 
F. Contact Person 
John Patterson 
RBRC  
1000 Parkwood Circle Ste 450 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
678.419.9990 
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AUTOMOBILE BUMPER TAKE-BACK STRATEGIES 
iscretionary take-back policies for U.S. automakers are limited to a relatively small component 
 an automobile: bumpers.   
turn’s take-back strategy19 
turn’s take-back program is managed in-house and is initiated by collecting bumpers at 
alerships when independent auto body shop employees come to pick up new parts.  The 
maged bumpers are transported from dealerships to the factory in trucks that are returning from 
livering new cars.  The bumpers are processed and reground into new pellets and then sold to 
to parts manufacturers for use in mostly non-visible parts production such as wheel wells and 
ater housings. 
.  Factors Behind Implementation 
turn has a strong commitment to environmental stewardship.  This commitment led to the 
itiation of the program that is designed to reduce landfilled materials.   
.  Economic Assessment 
turn is now finding that it enjoys cost savings from using recycled resins rather than virgin 
sins.  Exact numbers were not available. 
.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
s of 1996, Saturn was only collecting 15 bumpers per day, amounting to approximately 10% of 
w bumpers being shipped to dealers for repairs to new cars. 
.  Barriers to Success 
echnical barriers exist in the form of paint and contaminants that are attached to the returned 
mpers. 
.  Recommended Improvements 
turn has yet to involve end-of-life cars into its take-back and recycling network. 
 Contact Person 
eri Meghreblian 
turn Corporation 
nvironmental affairs 
1.489.4839 
eghreblian@gm.com 
   30 
 
CAMERA TAKE-BACK STRATEGIES 
 
The single use camera industry has developed an extensive infrastructure to reuse and recycle 
single use cameras. After consumers take the camera to a photofinisher for developing, the 
cameras are returned to the manufacturers for disassembly and extraction of reusable parts, which 
include the main unit (circuit board), flash unit, lens and battery.  The recyclable parts include the 
front and back covers; the switch unit and the advance wheel are sent for resin recycling to be 
used in new cameras or other products.20 
 
FujiFilm 
 
Fuji operates a true product take-back program by purchasing its cameras from photofinishers for 
$.15 each.  Fuji also pays for the cameras’ transportation back to its Greenwood S.C. plant for 
sorting, disassembly and reuse.  At this time, Fuji reuses the flash, circuits and other components 
of the camera and recycles the polystyrene cases into other parts. 21 
 
A.   Factors Encouraging Adoption of EPR 
The motivation for Fuji to begin take-back of its single use cameras began as an environmental 
stewardship initiative.  Environmental groups were complaining about the impacts of  
“disposable” cameras and Fuji responded with its camera recycling initiative.  Cost savings were 
realized after the program had commenced and Fuji realized gains from asset recovery.  
However, we could not obtain data on the cost saving component of the program. 
 
B.  Economic Assessment: 
The main costs of the program include the purchase of the cameras from finishers, transport to 
the factory, and costs to disassemble, clean, test, and sort the recovered materials.  Prior to the 
completion of the Greenwood plant, the program was less economically viable because cameras 
had to be shipped to Japan for disassembly.  The revenues associated with the program are not 
publicly available, but according to the company the program is “economically beneficial.” 
 
C.  Intangibles 
Fuji believes that the single use camera take-back program has contributed positively to the 
company’s experience with product life cycle analysis.  By integrating program cost/benefit 
analysis with environmental stewardship, a flagship program has developed.  It has led directly to 
the creation of the first “inverse manufacturing” plant in the world.  At the company’s Ashigara 
factory, robots automatically separate, disassemble, clean, replace parts and reassemble Fuji 
Quick Snap single use cameras.  Another benefit generated by the program is the growth of 
industry cooperation to support product stewardship.  Kodak, FujiFilm and Konica work together 
to support a dramatic change from what was once considered a disposable camera to a renewable 
piece of photographic equipment. 
 
D.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
Currently, Fuji receives back 110% of the cameras it sells in the U.S.  Receipts of third party 
cameras that are returned by finishers to Fuji account for the additional amount. 
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E.  Barriers to Success 
Third party “reloaders” corrupt the take-back and asset recovery process.  They commonly tape 
the cameras cases back together after putting in new film.  This tape contaminates the recycling 
stream and adds to the incremental labor costs of reusing the camera.  A patent infringement case 
has been filed by Fuji against these reloaders in an attempt to decrease the importing of third 
party cameras.  
 
F.  Future Improvements 
Currently Fuji is not recycling the polystyrene camera cases into new cases.  In the near future 
they intend to close the loop in their manufacturing process by recycling cases back into cases. 
 
G.  Contact Person 
Mr. Girish Menon 
FujiFilm Environmental and Safety Affairs Manager 
800.755.8293 
 
Kodak 
 
Kodak’s hallmark example of its design-for-the-environment initiative is its program to recycle 
FunSaver and other single use cameras.  An average of 86 percent (by weight) of all cameras are 
recycled or reused in the manufacturing of new cameras. As part of Kodak's Environmental 
Action Program, film processors are asked to return all Kodak One-Time-Use Cameras for  
recycling.22 
 
A.   Factors Encouraging Adoption of EPR 
Kodak adopted its Single Use Camera (SUC) take-back program for two reasons.  First, 
“disposable” cameras were being criticized by environmental groups, and Kodak felt that the lack 
of a reuse program would be a barrier to the sale of SUCs.  Second, Kodak implemented the 
program for cost saving reasons.  
 
B.  Economic Assessment: 
Kodak does not disclose the cost savings associated with its program, but does that savings from 
remanufacturing are substantial.  Kodak reuses nearly all of the camera and is reusing the camera 
batteries internally or is re-selling them in secondary markets.  As a result, over 90% of the 
camera is being either reused or recycled.  
 
C.  Structural Changes 
The infrastructure Kodak developed is now being used to return the plastic film containers as 
well as the metal casing and photo paper cores from Kodak film.  Kodak feels that the SUC 
program has made the entire management team aware of the “win/win” scenario available for 
both the company and the community with a successful environmental initiative. 
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D.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
Kodak has applied Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) to its SUC program to increase recycling levels 
and to reduce the environmental impact of the product.  With recyclable/reusable content over 
90% (including the battery), Kodak’s cameras are almost fully optimized for material recovery. 
 
E.  Barriers to Success 
Kodak has identified two main barriers to the program in addition to the third party reloaders 
identified by Fuji (see below).  First, retail photofinishers outside of North America are not 
participating in the program to the extent desirable.  They might be selling cameras to reloaders 
or merely throwing the cameras away instead of returning them to Kodak at no cost to 
themselves.  The main reason for non-participation is a lack of awareness of the camera take 
back and reuse program.  Second, the Basel ban on international hazardous waste shipments 
made it impossible to trans-ship the cameras across borders to collection centers because of the 
alkaline batteries that power the flash in some units.  Although alkaline batteries are not 
considered hazardous waste in the U.S., most European nations do not delineate battery types in 
their hazardous waste regulations.  As a result, many photofinishers in Europe simply dispose of 
the cameras in the trash rather than contracting with special recycling companies to transport the 
cameras. 
 
F.  Future Improvements 
Kodak recently completed an agreement with three Nordic countries and the United Kingdom to 
allow shipment of its cameras to the UK for collection and remanufacturing.  By consolidating its 
collection centers, Kodak can lower costs of shipping, reduce product cycle times, and achieve 
economies of scale in its remanufacturing process.  The lowering of these regulatory barriers 
would greatly enhance the effectiveness of the program, as would more extensive education of 
international photo finishers. 
 
G.  Contact Person 
Rob Fischmann 
Kodak World Wide Recycling Coordinator 
716.724.9049 
Robert.Fischmann@Kodak.com 
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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS 
(OEMs) 
 
Dell Computers 
 
Dell operates a product take-back system similar to Xerox’s more heralded operation.  Dell offers 
computers on a lease so that customers don’t have to worry about disposal regulations.  At the 
end of the lease, the equipment is returned to Dell to be refurbished or utilized using other asset 
recovery techniques.  In addition, Dell operates a value recovery service that repatriates 
functional equipment and pays a fair market value to the customer.  Dell also offers a PC 
recycling service intended to pick up non-functional equipment.  Dell collects these products 
from locations that can meet targets for minimum numbers of units and transports them to a 
disposition center.  Units that have economic value are sold to vendors; units with no residual 
value are recycled by other vendors according to strict statements-of-work.  Less than 1% of the 
non-functional products that Dell receives end up in landfills.23 
 
A.  Factors Encouraging Adoption of EPR 
Dell began the asset recovery service in 1991 long before recycling was fashionable.  It did so as 
a sales tool that enabled Dell to sell to large customers who needed older machines removed after 
upgrading to Dell machines. 
 
B.  Economic Assessment 
Dell will not release information regarding the costs associated with its asset recovery service.  
Dell views the service as an important part of its marketing strategy and its activities are financed 
by sales of new units. 
 
C.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
Dell is only concerned that customers are not fully utilizing their service and are storing or 
disposing of equipment in a non-environmentally sound manner. 
 
D.  Barriers to Success 
Dell’s asset recovery service does not receive any revenue in recovered assets from non-
functional equipment.  Rather this potential revenue is credited to Dell from the vendor to 
subsidize future disposal of machines.   
 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
 
Hewlett-Packard Company is a market leader in information technology equipment and has been 
a pioneer in environmental stewardship since the early 1990s.  HP has utilized Design-for-
Environment practices since 1995 and institutionalized strict green procurement criteria as well.  
HP does not have a formal domestic take-back program for its retail customers.  HP recovers 
equipment through its trade-in and trade-up programs and through its Unix leasing business 
segment.  In addition, HP has an extensive take-back program for its printer toner cartridges.  HP 
states that they have recycled over 25 million LaserJet cartridges worldwide since the program 
began, avoiding 31,000 tons of landfilled materials.24 
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A.  Factors Encouraging Adoption of EPR 
HP initiated its existing take-back program for three primary reasons.  First, customers were 
demanding value for computers and peripherals that they wanted to replace with new units.  The 
HP trade-in program provided customer satisfaction for this marketing segment.  Customers who 
required environmentally sound disposal of their equipment could be assured that their needs 
would be met by HP’s stringent environmental disposal techniques.  Second, the trade-in 
program was a necessary component in HP's business development plan.  Finally, HP was able to 
realize cost savings from the retrieved materials.  Valuable or scarce components could be 
retrieved from newer equipment and remanufactured for sale in new units. 
 
B.  Economic Assessment 
Like other demanufacturing operations surveyed in this report, HP expressed the belief that 
environmentally sound treatment of end-of-life equipment is expensive.  These products have 
very little market value with which to offset disposal costs.  At HP’s Roseville, California 
demanufacturing site the costs associated with processing end-of-life  goods are offset by 
revenues received from the higher value commercial take-backs from trade-ins and trade-ups to 
yield a break-even for the facility as a whole.  HP’s ability to operate at a break-even is, in part, 
due to its investment in some of the largest and most sophisticated shredding and separation 
equipment available.  With approximately six million dollars invested in this demanufacturing 
equipment, it is a cornerstone of HP’s commitment to environmental goals and achievements. 
 
C.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
HP’s program is very effective according to Renee St. Denis, Environmental Business Unit 
Manager at HP.  The company processes approximately 3.5 million pounds of products a month 
with none of the recovered materials going to landfills. 
 
D.  Barriers to Success 
Due to ill-defined burden sharing arrangements between distributors, resellers and manufacturers, 
HP is not ready for full scale consumer take-backs.  The company believes that the responsibility 
for the costs incurred for product returning, demanufacturing and disposal have not been 
specified at the point of sale.  Placing the burden solely on the HP would not be equitable since 
value is extracted all along the supply chain. 
 
E.  Future Improvements 
In addition to clarification of burden sharing for a retail take-back program, HP feels that its 
program could be improved through regulatory reform that would declassify broken monitors as 
hazardous materials.  Reverse logistics problems also need to be addressed as well as work on 
effective plastics recycling to reduce costs and to meet new product quality requirements. 
 
F.  Contact Person 
Renee St. Denis 
Environmental Business Unit Manager 
renee_stdenis@hp.com 
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IBM  
 
As part of its Product End-of-Life Management (PELM) activities, IBM began offering product 
take-back programs in Europe in 1989 and continues to enhance and expand these offerings. 
There are currently 14 such programs in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. There are 9 major Materials 
Recovery Centers around the world, and additional locations support parts return and regional 
collection. In 1999 more than 59,000 metric tons of manufacturing scrap, IBM-owned end-of-life 
machines and customer-returned equipment were processed through these operations. IBM sent 
only 3.7% of this amount to landfills. 
 
Recycling and dismantling expertise is shared among the Materials Recovery Centers in order to 
increase recycling efficiencies and reduce the amount of waste sent to landfills.  In addition, the 
centers share their experiences, concerns and recommendations with IBM product development 
teams in order to ensure that issues affecting the end-of-life management of products are 
addressed early in the design phase of new products. 
 
Pitney-Bowes (PB) 
 
PB is a world leader in mail meters and mail systems as well as copiers and fax machines.  Asset 
recovery has been an integral part of PB’s operations for many years, in part because of U.S. 
Postal Service regulations that required postage meters to be leased and not owned.  This means 
that PB must take-back leased metering equipment, making it easy for them to expand product 
take-back into other product lines.  PB contracts out to third party vendors to do regional sweeps 
to pick up products and ship them to a cross dock until sufficient numbers have been 
accumulated and then parts are shipped to a regional PB disposition center. 
 
A.   Factors Encouraging Adoption of EPR  
Cost saving was a primary driver in PB’s adoption of product take-back and remanufacturing.  
Meter and mailing systems have a high residual book value, so recovery and subsequent 
remanufacturing is an efficient mechanism from an accounting standpoint. 
 
B.  Economic Assessment 
PB estimates that total net savings from reused parts amounted to $8.2m in 1998.  
Remanufactured parts are offered to customers at one-half to one-fifth of the cost of a new part.  
These parts are especially beneficial when used to satisfy a PB service contract, where the 
difference between a remanufactured part and a new part is added to the profitability of the 
contract. 
 
C.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
PB performs sophisticated tests such as signature analysis to ensure that remanufactured parts 
meet quality standards.  The recovery process has led to improvements in product design and 
testing.  Remanufactured products can benefit from design changes that might make them 
superior to new ones. 
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D.  Barriers to Success 
The costs associated with qualifying parts and components as reliable can be a barrier to the 
program’s cost efficiency.  Remanufactured systems compete with new systems in sales targets 
and can cannibalize sales.  Customers’ perceptions that remanufactured products are inferior to 
new ones can serve as an additional barrier, especially when customers' pricing requirements for 
these products are below PB’s cost structure. 
 
E.   Future Improvements 
PB is waiting for ISO standards that will govern the use of reused parts in new products. 
 
F.  Contact Person 
Harold Williams 
203.351.7863 
williaha@pb.com                                         
 
Xerox Corporation 
 
Beginning in 1993, Xerox was undoubtedly the first U.S. corporation to begin an aggressive 
product take-back program. Xerox achieves this by leasing products to customers rather than 
selling them.  This enables Xerox to recover the product through what it calls Asset Recycling 
Management (ARM).  The returned products are sent to a dedicated recycling center to be 
remanufactured or disassembled for material reclamation.   
 
A.  Factors Encouraging Adoption of EPR  
Xerox is committed to a strategy of environmental stewardship through the reduction of waste 
and promoting the use of recycled materials.   
 
B.  Economic Assessment: 
The financial benefits of equipment remanufacture and parts reuse amount to several hundred 
million dollars a year.25 
 
C.  Assessment of Effectiveness 
Xerox uses a design for the environment (DFE) strategy with the goal of producing waste-free 
products.  Through the use of sophisticated signature testing, life-cycle analysis, design for 
analysis software and product coding Xerox has re-engineered its manufacturing process. 
 
D.  Barriers to Success 
Misperception among some customers that products with some recycled part content are inferior 
to those built from all-new parts. 
 
E.  Contact Person  
Jack Azar 716.422.9506 
 
 
 
  
HOME APPLIANCE (WHITE GOODS) INDUSTRY STRATEGIES 
 
Prompted by landfill bans on white goods in 16 U.S. states, the appliance industry has committed 
itself to major structural changes in the way the industry designs, produces and distributes its 
products.  An industry group known as MARMA, the Major Appliance Resource Management 
Alliance, has been organized to actively promote environmentally sound and sustainable 
management of material streams from the final disposition of major home appliances.  Product 
refurbishment and remanufacturing as well as product leasing are other new developments in the 
industry.  
 
Electrolux/Frigidaire Company26 
 
Frigidaire has been a pioneer in designing products for recyclability.  In 1994, it began a 
refrigerator recyclability assessment that instigated significant changes in product design.  Plastic 
use was consolidated from three types into one resulting in cost savings from larger volume 
purchases from the remaining supplier. The number and complexity of parts in subassemblies 
was reduced which facilitated significant cost savings in material and labor inputs.  Plastics were 
marked according to resin type to aid in identification and recycling. 
 
 
 
 Functional Sales:  Pay-per-wash 
In November 1999, Electrolux introduced a new pilot project called Pay-per-Wash, at the 
Gotland Island in Sweden. The island was chosen because it’s the only place in the world 
thus far with Internet-connected electrical meters installed in 7 000 households, which 
allows for remote reading.  
 
The customer borrows a new washing machine and pays only SEK 495, which is the actual 
cost for the installation. During the installation, the washer is connected via an “intelligent” 
electrical meter and the Internet to a central database that keeps track of consumption. The 
customer pays for the use of the washing machine, around SEK 10 per washing cycle, 
which is charged on the electricity bill. The machine is owned and serviced by Electrolux. 
When the machine has served its duty, it is taken back and can be scrapped, remanufactured 
or used as a source of spare parts.  
Source: Electrolux website http://193.183.104.77/node338.asp?nodeurl=node95.asp  37 
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